3 Points Toward a More Receptive and Conciliatory Left, Part III

1) Is objectivity really impossible, and what are some pitfalls in valuing subjectivity?
2) Have we placed an undue emphasis on cultural and linguistic factors when considering inequality?
3) When should we commit to ideological positions, and when should we compromise?


Trump is now president, and the Republicans have gained majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the post-election analysis, blame has been laid on 3rd party candidates, the media for covering Trump and giving him free publicity, Clinton’s past indiscretions, unreliable projections, and the electoral college system. One possible factor that the Democrats have identified is that they hadn’t reached out enough to white working-class voters.

I can’t speak to campaign strategies and their miscalculations; however, as a graduate student in a leftist interdisciplinary department, I have been frustrated for years at my fellow scholars’ ideological purity. I believe that a deterioration of civil society is scary, but I also fear that Trump being elected has vindicated a belief on the left that the right is so far gone that we have nothing to work with, while believing ourselves morally and intellectually superior. The use of “social justice warriors” and “feminazi” in dismissive and derogatory ways certainly speaks to resistance on the part of conservatives, however the sheer frequency of these labels makes me believe that the fault does not lie entirely with them.  Finally, the fact that many college-educated men backed Trump, and that even great numbers of White women voted for him, says that there is something we’re missing in the work we do in humanities and liberal arts research and higher education, even as we are trying to educate the electorate.

This is a part of a series of 3 posts that will try to answer the 3 questions above. Each of the 3 questions tries to interrogate a concept that, as I see it, has become common sense to thinkers on the left to the extent that we cannot apply it with nuance or communicate its value to non-believers. Each post will explain and give examples of one concept and its goals, then a response discussing its shortcomings and misapplication.

As this is the last post in this series, I will end on an interpretation of the “urgency” to respond to the world, how we can tweak the concept of radical pedagogy, and finally discuss incentive and not condemnation as the basis of social change.


Progressive Concept #3: Social change requires a revolution that fundamentally changes social structures. Those seeking change have less power and access to resources, and therefore should give no quarter to avoid legitimizing the current status quo.

First, I think American culture has a implicit culture of competition rather than cooperation. Our democratic political system and  legal system are both adversarial: individuals represent their own ideas in the public sphere for contention, where achievement is defined by the ability to maintain one’s ideas and to convince others, not by achieving harmony. Deferring to others is not seen favourably. We have sayings like “give an inch and they’ll take a mile,” and we also attach shame to being a “sell-out.” These are commonly held cultural attitudes that both shape and are shaped by social processes.

More specifically, even when people from historically dominant groups may mean well, they are unable to step outside their own common sense to critique  themselves, and they also have less incentive to create change. For example, in the Reconstruction Era after the Civil War, measures such as the Grandfather clause were set up to limit voting for newly emancipated Blacks; even recently, Voter ID laws disproportionately affected older Black voters. While Republicans have denied that this was their intent, the fact that they did not change this policy after criticism from multiple groups suggest that they at least implicitly or unconsciously protect their own interest. To mitigate this kind of problem, social change needs to arise from the people who best understand their needs, and need to work against the entrenched common sense of those in power. In addition, social structure and social rules have been created based on those common sense ideas, further naturalizing them. This means that separatism, which is self-determination apart from the interference of dominant groups, is a legitimate demand.

Groups who have been in power have more access to social and political resources, and thus they can enact sweeping, multi-sited  policies according to their common sense; an example is lobbyists who represent industries, which have more resources and networks with which they can push for favourable policies, whereas a non-English-speaking and less educated neighbourhood living near a toxic waste dump would not. Multi-sited policies are a key difference. Discriminatory voting laws, residential segregation,  employment discrimination, differential taxation and funding, high school tracking, and law-and-order policing are some of the different aspects of social life that cumulatively form a racist social structure in the US, which also accumulates over time. The left, especially Marxist-informed radicals, have argued that reform can only change these issues superficially and in isolation, and only revolution (fundamentally reorganizing social relations and hierarchies) would redistribute power and advance social justice.

If those in power have advantages, the oppressed have limited tools and avenues; thus, their action. This is the logic behind the left calling civil unrest “uprisings” or “rebellions,” whereas mainstream and conservative media calls them “riots.” Those who have instigated uprisings had few advocacy groups to represent their interests, were unlikely to have access to mass media, and also do not have the educational background and network to investigate or communicate the causes of their oppression, so they resort to violence. Rather than fault them for this, uprisings and other forms of violence should be seen as a legitimate, if not ideal, expression of an overall social symptom.


Response #3: (since this is quite long, each point is linked to its respective section)

a) Sometimes the left advocates for separatism, yet denounces the right for being intractable and stuck in echo chambers

b) even as we allow that revolutionaries might not get it right when they are creating change, we are not forgiving or encouraging when the right and people in power fail to understand progressive perspectives

c) Radicals on the left advocate a complete overhaul of society by any means necessary, and this is sometimes reduced to disrupting the status quo without a corresponding emphasis on how to reconstruct our ideal world.

+Last bits on “urgency”, radical pedagogy, and incentives.

a) I should note that I support voluntary separatism in private life. In Part I I mentioned Black students at Scripps who asked for a room mate of colour in an ad, which lead to charges of reverse-racism. While I take issue with the singular focus on race, I do not categorically take issue with excluding certain people in the ad. To me, whom to bring into your home is part of your private life, should be allowed as long as there are no demonstrable wide-ranging or public effects (ie, Black students asking for a non-White roommate would not cause a housing shortage for White students). To a certain extent I also support separatism for Indigenous communities because there is material resources at stake with quite a different view on how to manage the resources, which is unlikely to find compromise under the current world order that emphasizes automation and economic growth.

It is also true that many progressives were set on their path due to having endured discrimination. I am also not saying that the burden is always on the oppressed to understand their oppressors.  However, researchers, educators, journalists and other social critics in their professional careers should not isolate themselves from dissenting opinion, and should take on responsibility to understand all elements of society, including those who have oppressed others. This is especially the case for academics on the left whose research rests on the premise that prevailing social structures and discourses are faulty and that those outside the prevailing social discourses, ie them, can do better. If they have taken up the mantle of being a social critic or an academic, they should then not refuse to entertain ideas that might help advance society because it infringes on their personal comfort. If they cannot do this, they need not become social critics or academics.

In addition, exposure to the hurtful actions of the right does not equal exposure to the complexities of their position and ideology. As per Part I, one of the interventions of progressive thinkers is to deconstruct the universal subject. In doing so, many people who have been disenfranchised for not fitting into the universal mould have been somewhat redeemed. However, leftist separatism, taken too far, can replace the universal subject with the good liberal subject in a way that does not necessitate an understanding of why some people do not have access to liberal beliefs. I will give a few examples from my graduate student time that demonstrates how separatism and its simplification can induce backlash, and how seeking to understand can be constructive.

My first time TAing was for a Women’s Studies class, and after a few weeks other students started acting out. On November 11th, the professor discussed how celebrating veterans and soldiers (often male) ignores how female civilians can become collateral damage or the target of sexual assault, and a student interrupted the lecture to ask for a moment of silence for the troops.  Students who weren’t enrolled in my classes started dropping in. Other TAs reported that students didn’t read course materials yet argued with them in class. The year after, a classmate told me that one of the TAs had started her term by telling both her classes that she hated men. I recalled that once during lunch she had also told me that she refused to read novels written by men. Her students got a negative impression of women’s studies from her statements, and acted out indirectly or behaved in a confrontational manner. This TA was not in general an unpleasant or unintelligent person, and seemed to have truly believed that her actions were feminist, yet her oversimplification of men and the oversimplification of appropriate attitude towards gender inequality turned students against Women’s Studies.

On the other hand, one of the most positive experiences I had was seeing a professor encouraged a fellow student, who is White, to stop thinking about her family merely as perpetrators. The student comes from a family whose male members have enlisted in the military for generations, and are firm believers of traditional masculinity and straightness, the American right to power, and a firm division between good and evil. However, the professor said that working-class White men are easily targeted by sociocultural discourses such as masculine pride and white supremacy. At the same time that these narratives are harmful and her family members have perpetrated harm, it is also possible to see that they have been targeted by these narratives, which cannot be reduced to individual actors.

These 2 contrasting ways of characterizing the right also emerged after the election. From observing people in my department, on the one hand there have been professors and graduate students who stated that Trump’s victory cannot be rationalized, that economic arguments are not an excuse for supporting Trump, and characterized Trump supporters as a simply taking pleasure in being racist and misogynist. To me, this attitude is exactly the same as White attitudes during the Watts and Rodney King uprisings, which characterized Blacks as having no economic excuse to riot, and it’s just that Blacks are simply more predisposed to violence. It disturbs me that academics, who are professional thinkers, can be blind to the fact that they lodged themselves in the same position as those that they critique on the other side of the political spectrum. Thankfully, on the other hand, there are grad students who have said that they see a greater need to go back to their White working class families on holidays for dialogue, and professors teaching ethnic and gender studies who have revised their syllabi to include readings on how inequality involves and impacts Whites and men.

b) When enacting change, the disenfranchised and those in power do differ in their ability to enact policy. However, while at the group level access to social resources is vastly different, on an individual level access to conceptual resources may not be that different.

To me, common sense and values for the average person does not come from either book learning or from access to social and political resources. These sources can expand possible perspectives, but these impersonally learned perspectives are not substantiated without long-term exposure involving personal relationships. Ie, abstract and impersonal stakes such as social well-being, or the pursuit of knowledge, are not as good motivators as a personal connection that you might lose if you can’t come to an understanding.  The most fundamental shifts in my thinking have come from having built a social circle among societies with very different values. I would say that the size and internal variation of this personal and most immediate social circle is probably roughly the same for most people in North America, regardless of identity categories, especially when young – ie a wealthy young White person is not likely to have more friends and family, or friends and family with a greater range of values, than a poor young Black person. And thus, people with privilege are not better primed to understand kinds of common sense that are not their own, even if they have more opportunities to learn about differences in an abstract way.

In other words, I believe that no one can really help the way they think and see the world, privilege doesn’t make much of a difference, and any changes made to one’s thinking would take concerted effort. Expecting otherwise, it seems to me, contradicts the point made about subjectivity and objectivity in Part I. If those on the left insist that people who have been in power have not succeeded in being universal and objective, then they are just as subjectively positioned as anyone else; if they are as subjectively positioned as anyone else, there’s no reason they would be better primed to change their subjective positions. This may sound patronizing, but what the left can do is lower our expectations of the centre and the right (while not categorically denouncing them, as per the (a) section).

Thus, when the centre and the right haven’t grasped or enacted what we think is right, our response should not be condemnation. Many of my friends are international students who do not understand race relations in the US, and have had negative experiences with American people of colour who cannot understand their positionality. A friend from Asia related an experience in an MFA filmmaking program where another Asian classmate casually commented that she would not like to live in a neighbourhood with high crime rates, such as X Black neighbourhood. Another Black film student overheard and refused to come to class, petitioned student services who in turn mandated  extra readings and lectures on cultural sensitivity for the international students, and used her racism as the topic of her MFA project that was later showcased to the whole class. The international students, my friend included, felt singled out and punished for being ignorant of something they had no opportunity to learn about, and certainly did not feel more motivated to learn about US race relations afterwards.

Similarly, another case is the film Selma, about MLK’s organization of the Selma to Montgomery marches. The film depicts Lyndon B Johnson as being obstructionist, which caused a great deal of controversy, as historically LBJ seemed to have done the best that he could (though I’m not a Historian and can’t attest to the details).The controversy was framed in terms of historical accuracy vs artistic license, where the director defended their choice to have characters in diverse political positions for a good story. To me, the issue with Selma is better framed in terms of encouragement vs condemnation. Especially since Selma was a widely-released film in 2014, its depiction of various parties involved in Civil Rights can serve as examples of how to overcome new forms of racism in the 21st century. This includes allies in the 1960s setting an example for potential non-Black allies in the present. Discounting LBJ’s efforts and accomplishments seem to be counterproductive for gaining new allies, since one interpretation of the filmmakers’ decisions would be that White people’s efforts would be unrecognized or even falsified by Black activists, so why bother?

A rejoinder to what I point out above might be that achieving social justice for the disenfranchised is more important than protecting the feelings of the privileged, which is something I hear radicals say often. While I don’t disagree with this in an objective sense, subjective experiences are immediate and real to the individuals who have them. Especially for people who did not grow up with a liberal arts education that reinforces for them a sense of objective equity, what is left is their feelings, and it seems an oversight for the left not to factor that in. The behaviour of Trump’s voter base shows that there is a cost to steamrolling over someone’s feelings in an attempt to achieve justice. Moreover, the example I gave of international students bewildered by American race relations point to a danger of leftists becoming imperialist without knowing it. Saving face is an important concept to people from Asia, and I don’t think achieving social justice for the US should bear the cost of so casually steamrolling over other cultures’ sense of appropriate behaviour.

To wrap up points a) and b): by virtue of sheer logic, isolation works both ways – if the right is isolated from the ideas of the left, then the left is also isolated from the right. This isolation can only be breached from both sides trying to establish a dialogue. An acquaintance once joked about how radicals and missionaries respond differently to people who are unconvinced: leftists say “you’re a horrible person,” whereas missionaries say “it’s fine, I’m sure you will find your own path to God.” This is true – missionaries derive from their beliefs a capacity to be patient with nonbelievers, whereas those on the left often write off those on the right as lost causes. I’m not religious myself, however I think it’s a shame that religion has a bad rap for those on the left – at the same that that we are attentive to abuses perpetuated in the name of religion, we can learn a lot from them regarding how to practice and disseminate what we believe in.

c) a) and b) addressed how those on the left may simplify and condemn those on the right, and this last section will address how internally on the left, radicals often adopt a purist position that invalidates work being done by liberals and the centre. In this politics of purity, change is conceptualized as effective only if it it comes out of tearing down the status quo, and not working within the system. Part of this does come from the fact that inequality necessitates fundamental changes, as I have discussed in the first half of this post. However, a politics of purity fosters a mentality of “if you’re not with us, you’re against us,” and this can relegate radicals and their visions to the fringe because they cannot reach others who want change (As I come from an academic setting, most of the examples I give are observed from fellow academics who identify as radical).

First, among radicals, agency and complicity are often diametrically opposed. That is, someone who goes along with the status quo (complicit) has been brainwashed into doing so and are not exercising their agency, and only standing against the status quo is proof of agency. This is an overly simplistic view of choice and leaves out the possibility that someone could have used their agency and chosen to be complicit, or that someone who stands against the status quo had been coerced into doing so. This creates a scenario where radicals become pressured to disagree because this more easily demonstrates that they can exercise agency, rather than reflect on what they are disagreeing with.  An instance from a PhD class reflected this. We read an academic book called X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent, which argues that the “X” signatures made by Native leaders on unfavourable treaty documents in the past should not be seen simply as a sign that they gave up, but that they exercised agency in assenting to certain forms of colonialism. Almost everyone in the class criticized the book for being an apologist for colonialism and capitalism. In doing so, they implicitly communicated that the only those who have stood against capitalism and colonialism are worth studying. In addition, in a class setting they seemed to have been trying to show their critical thinking abilities and leftist tendencies by criticizing the book rather than reflect on its argument.

The emphasis on disagreement can lead to a progressive politics that is increasingly negatively articulated. Recently I saw an article in the New York Times asking the same question: “A ‘Resistance’ Stands Against Trump. But What Will It Stand For?” One section goes as follows: “A call to resist is different from a call to ‘organize’ or — to borrow a word from the long-ago Age of Obama — to ‘dream.’ Those words conjure visions of better worlds. Resistance names what you don’t want and leaves the vision thing for another, less urgent situation.” The article also ends by saying that “But the mere act of refusal often turns out to have its own momentum. As people learn that they can indeed say ‘no,’ they may begin to find new ways toward saying ‘yes.'” While this is hopeful, I believe it further strengthens the negative articulation of politics, and it is also a little naïve to think that criticism of the status quo has a direct throughline to enacting change. It is definitely urgent for Middle Easterners excluded by Executive Order 13769, refugees and otherwise, but I do not think that Trump is such an urgent matter for most of the US such that we only have time to say “no.” In fact, I think those most urgently affected by the travel ban are preoccupied with surviving day to day or visiting immigration lawyers, not taking the time to demonstrate just so they can say “no.” In other words, being critical of the status quo is the beginning to change; criticism and disagreement is a necessary, but not in of itself sufficient, condition for social change.

Second, I’d like to address radicals aiming to fundamentally change society. While this is a noble goal, i) it discourages social engagement that is currently possible while not offering any paths to the ideal, and ii) lead to radicals accusing liberals of pandering to the system when they try to work within it, which can alienate potential allies. An example of this attitude is a blog post on Occupy Wall Street by Judith Butler, one of the most influential thinkers on the left, especially with regards to how gender is a socially constructed concept. In this post, Butler responds to criticisms against Occupy that they did not make a coherent list of demands. She argues that a list of demands does not explain how these demands are related to one another, and “We cannot fix the one form of inequality without understanding the broader trends of inequality we are seeking to overcome.” She also responds to criticisms against Occupy that demands should be realistic, saying that a demand that the government is willing to fulfill usually means that it would not be a demand that fundamentally challenges government. In addition, “to appeal to that authority to satisfy the demand would be one way of attributing legitimacy to that authority” – that is, at the same time as disagreeing with the government on policies, appealing to the government to change policies still implicitly agrees with the government that they should be in control.

While all of this is true, and while I appreciate that much critical theory and cultural studies do point out assumptions we hold, often I (and my undergrads) are left with a question, “So what should we do?” Last September, when TAing a general education course that included a book with a similar position to the blog post regarding Occupy, a student asked in frustration, “Does this mean we shouldn’t vote?” A rejoinder has been that it is not the job of the liberal arts and critical theory to prescribe, but challenge us to think differently. While this is also true, I believe that these disciplines that challenges us to think different operate at a level that is disconnected from Business, Management, Accounting, Policy, International Relations, Economics, Law, and a whole host of other disciplines (not even counting the Sciences and trade jobs) that focus on things to be done. Without some gesture to possible actions based on leftist critiques, the demands to act in mainstream disciplines and to earn a living in those jobs might overwhelm any critical thinking in the abstract. In addition, critical theory can choose to position itself against these disciplines to critique them, but in doing so, it may fail to speak at all to their adherents.

This leads me to an issue with the radical left condemning politically neutral humanities and social science disciplines. It’s understandable to be critical of professional disciplines like Business Administration, however it makes less sense to be categorically critical of a research field like Political Science. As I talked about at the end of Part I, social science disciplines are suspect because they rely on implicit assumptions which have biases towards those in power. For example, Political Science to a certain degree assumes that we need a government of some kind, which leftist anarchists would reject. In addition, I have seen fellow scholars argue that disciplines that rely on big data cannot address inequality because the complexities of personhood and subjectivity becomes lost in the data. While all of these criticisms might be true, saying that data-driven disciplines are entirely complicit with power would be writing off knowledge that can look at broad material differences in society.

It also conflates what a discipline tends not to do with what it cannot do. It is true that Political Science might get funding from the establishment, or that International Relations are located in a country which seeks to use IR training for is own advantage in world politics. However, this does not mean that those disciplines are inherently uncritical; if we can historicize the reasons that they developed to be such, we can change the discipline. An example of a discipline which has changed is History, which had almost entirely been about monarchs, wars, and territory, but increasingly taking into account the histories of topics such as immigration, women’s movements, and cultural practices such as theatre-going. A discipline also has recourse to multiple methods which can offset one another’s weaknesses, for example using oral history along with census statistics.

What it comes down to for me is a different definition and approach to “urgency.” To me, urgency is not about demonstrating on the streets to express disagreement with the status quo. It is about being able to proactively engage the system as it is, because the consequences of not engaging can be immediate and severe. I’d hate to think, for example, that teaching radical theory to undergrads meant that we had dissuaded some of them from voting in the last election.

I also disagree with radical thinkers who suggest that having short-term goals with a focus on results undermines our ability to imagine long-term ideals (see, for example, the first comment to the post regarding Occupy). To me, this position does not give thinkers on the left enough credit to simultaneously hold short-term goals and long-term visions, or to implement short-term goals with an awareness that they might be provisional, and also to think of how to pre-empt ways provisional goals might be co-opted. Finally, incremental goals should also not be conflated with isolated goals, which the post on Occupy addresses. It is true that we cannot take one aspect of social life, ie policing, or education, or employment discrimination, and hope to solve all inequality, which impinges on many different spheres of life. A more realistic model that still can lead to the abstract ideal would be incremental changes in each sphere of life, with dialogue between the spheres to evaluate the synergy of changes over time.

Engaging the world with a sense of urgency is different from wanting an overnight revolution.   First, there is the matter of material infrastructure for a new way of life. Second, people and their mentality are like an infrastructure that needs to be built up so they can fit into a new way of life. I think this is what revolutionaries on the left forget. People on the left have spent a great deal of time thinking about and acting on their ideal world, that they have already mentally primed themselves to be part of it. They cannot imagine the mindset of someone who has not, for whom the new ideal world necessitates a longer transition period.

I think that many people can be negatively affected by change, even if it is a change for the better, because it requires effort to break old patterns and attachments and to learn new skills and ways of being. It is probably only the people already very committed to change who are willing to wade through the mundane realities of setting up a new infrastructure. People who don’t care strongly either way, which are most people, may oppose change just to keep the pattern they are used to. Instead of characterizing this tendency as reactionary, I think it is more generous for the left to recognize it as human – that most people want familiarity and want what they know and do to be valued. From a subjective perspective, I think it may be just as hard to ask people on the right to change their world view and way of life as asking an inner city worker to learn new professional skills when those jobs move offshore. It might take generational turnover for attitudes to shift. So, even as we engage with world with urgency for specific concrete problems, we should also be patient and acknowledge the deep time of social change. Reform is not opposed to revolution; I would say that revolution only occurs superficially without a longer history of reform.

Building the material infrastructure of a new society requires a new mental and affective infrastructure, which brings me to pedagogy.  I think academics and other thinkers should do theoretical research that has no immediate application, even if staving off social disintegration is urgent. However, pedagogy may not take the same approach as research. Academics on the left have espoused a concept called “radical pedagogy,” which is that education should help build students’ political awareness and advance social change, rather than just giving them technical knowledge. While I fully endorse this as a goal, radical pedagogy should not simply comprise of telling students about radical positions. In Part II I mentioned professors who took grades off if students did not use specific terminology, such as “undocumented” instead of “illegal” immigrants. To me, this is a lazy way of exercising radical pedagogy, as it punishes people for the beliefs that they had been previously taught. To truly succeed, radical pedagogy (or any education for that matter) should begin from the positionality of the learner and build upon what they know, rather than invalidate it. Understandably this is difficult, since due to inequality and segregation, upcoming privileged generations have very little on which a leftist educator can build upon. However, I think that because we are in the role of educators (and older and more experienced people), the task of finding how to work with very little falls on us. Since Trump’s election, there has been a growing blacklist of university professors who are accused of disseminating leftist propaganda and brainwashing students. This is alarming, however at the same time I also think that professors should not be shielded from public critique just because they are part of an institution, and I also hope that the silver lining would be that it enables educators on the left to revise their pedagogy.


To wrap up this series of posts, I’d like to bring in Part II’s point about paying attention to resources rather than attitudes, into the points here about understanding, encouragement, and being realistic.

Stokely Carmichael, a prominent thinker of the Black Power Movement, was disillusioned with Martin Luther King Jr.’s nonviolent approach that tried to instigate social change by gaining sympathy for Black suffering. Carmichael notably said, “In order for nonviolence to work, your opponent must have a conscience. The United States has none.” Given Trump’s election, I would amend this to, “In order for nonviolence to work, our potential allies must have an incentive. We have not given them enough.” While I do think the Black Power Movement’s recourse to violent resistance is  justified in their historical context, I also don’t think that a minority in the US can cause enough disincentive to really outweigh the US’s promised incentives, or outweigh the desire on the part of the privileged for things to stay the same.

Part of this may be needing centrists who are committed centrists, rather than people who don’t care enough to be on the far left or the far right. I traveled to Australia for a conference recently and read on the in-flight magazine about Waleed Aly, who got an Australian of the Year Award for being nuanced and understanding when approaching Australia’s equally divisive political scene. I doubt someone like Aly would win an award in an American cultural context, due to a legitimization of what he calls “the cycle of outrage.” I think the issues covered earlier regarding a negative articulation of politics, and a general American culture of adversarial democracy and justice, has made extremism and and expression of outrage the most valid expression of dedication, when there is really no inherent correlation between the two. I mentioned earlier that the left choose to disregard the feelings of the right at our peril. If we do, we fuel backlash and and contribute to a cycle of outrage.

In the carrot and stick analogy, the criticism and negative articulation of politics that I see on the left is like the left attempting to beat the right with a small stick. What I am advocating for is a shift to thinking about social change motivated by carrots for as many segments of society as possible. This involves acknowledging the right as human, with both shortcomings that we need to work with rather than demonize, and with potentials that we can play into. It involves understanding their positionality so we can imagine a future that takes in account their benefit, and pitch it convincingly. Instead of seeing the right, centre, and even liberals as opponents, we need to see them as potential allies; even when they oppose us, we can see them as a source of critique through which we can refine our visions for a better society that is productive and inclusive.

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3 Points Toward a More Receptive and Conciliatory Left, Part II

1) Is objectivity really impossible, and what are some pitfalls in valuing subjectivity?
2) Have we placed an undue emphasis on cultural and linguistic factors when considering inequality?
3) When should we commit to ideological positions, and when should we compromise?


Trump is now president, and the Republicans have gained majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the post-election analysis, blame has been laid on 3rd party candidates, the media for covering Trump and giving him free publicity, Clinton’s past indiscretions, unreliable projections, and the electoral college system. One possible factor that the Democrats have identified is that they hadn’t reached out enough to white working-class voters.

I can’t speak to campaign strategies and their miscalculations; however, as a graduate student in a leftist interdisciplinary department, I have been frustrated for years at my fellow scholars’ ideological purity. I believe that a deterioration of civil society is scary, but I also fear that Trump being elected has vindicated a belief on the left that the right is so far gone that we have nothing to work with, while believing ourselves morally and intellectually superior. The use of “social justice warriors” and “feminazi” in dismissive and derogatory ways certainly speaks to resistance on the part of conservatives, however the sheer frequency of these labels makes me believe that the fault does not lie entirely with them.  Finally, the fact that many college-educated men backed Trump, and that even great numbers of White women voted for him, says that there is something we’re missing in the work we do in humanities and liberal arts research and higher education, even as we are trying to educate the electorate.

This is a part of a series of 3 posts that will try to answer the 3 questions above. Each of the 3 questions tries to interrogate a concept that, as I see it, has become common sense to thinkers on the left to the extent that we cannot apply it with nuance or communicate its value to non-believers. Each post will explain and give examples of one concept and its goals, then a response discussing its shortcomings and misapplication.


Progressive Concept #2: Power is the ultimate axis along which people differ, however, it is an abstraction that can only reproduce itself through discourse.

Discourse is how we constitute and communicate knowledge, and then act upon that knowledge. In other words, following from Part I’s concept that absolute objectivity does not exist, knowledge is never neutral, and it usually created by those in power to serve their own power. For example, during the election, detractors of Hillary Clinton have either described her as shrill, which confirmed that her gender identity made her a weak candidate, or they described her as hawkish, which meant that she was denying her gender identity, which made her a badly-adjusted candidate. Thus, this kind of criticisms she faced were based on a discourse about appropriate gender behaviour, and not necessarily her merit, and was leveled against her by people who saw her as a challenge to their preferred status quo.

Discourses generate prototypes and stereotypes that guide further action. Research and theories about discourses (most recently stemming from the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault) have instigated something called “the cultural turn,” where scholars, and the broader public, have come to believe that culture is the realm where people have been indoctrinated with biases, and these biases in turn perpetuate inequality (or the opposite, that culture can give society news ways of thinking that can fix inequality). The most significant carrier of meaning in our culture is language, and so closely aligned with the cultural turn was “the linguistic turn,” which called attention to how language has the power to perpetuate or dissuade action. The idea behind the linguistic turn is that language does not transparently represent reality like we think it does, because language is more or less arbitrary symbols that we create to refer to what we decide is important out in the world. The story that Arctic peoples have a hundred words for “snow” may or may not be accurate, but they definitely have more words than English; it matters to their livelihood that they distinguish different kinds of snow through language and we don’t, even though in “reality” we get as much different kinds of snow as they do. Having more words for snow also means that Arctic peoples will more likely notice the differences between subtypes of snow, whereas we won’t. Thus, what snow “really” is depends on whose speaking and their language. This position can be summed up with the phrase “words have power.”

On the academic front, the discipline of Cultural Studies is where scholars can research and teach about how culture and language has developed to privilege certain kinds of common sense over others. Combined, the linguistic turn and the cultural turn help us by point out the constructedness of concepts, ideological motivations of people who have lead us to believe in those concepts, and how to imagine better alternatives. Criticism of Trump, for example, has called out his rhetoric as being misogynist and racist as part of this academic/cultural trend.

Response #2: Despite attention to power, in the US class is subordinated as a dimension with which to critique inequality. I believe that 3 broad tendencies have contributed to this:

a) the suppression of Marxian critique despite being in a society of advanced capitalism

b) the obviousness of race and gender as markers of difference in the US

c) theories of discourse and language have been reduced to political correctness

I would not say that Marx is entirely correct, however the essence of the definition of class is socioeconomic status, whereas neither race nor gender are defined essentially by socioeconomic status. In other words, in an alternate time / place, poor people will still be poor, but poverty may not be aligned with markers of biological difference. Obviously, whether one has power or not does not depend entirely on one’s socioeconomic status. For example, historically a woman who has high socioeconomic status based on her relationship to privileged male family members would still be unable to vote on legislations or shape public discourse if women were categorically denied the vote, especially on issues pertaining to gender. However, the current US is a country of advanced capitalism (especially in the post-New Deal era) defined by individual labour and commodification, and thus the extent of one’s abilities to sell one’s labour and buy life necessities in a large part determines how one lives life.

In the US, critiques based on this has come largely in the form of advocacy for more public spending on the part of the government, however prominent civic groups have not coalesced around class but ethnicity and gender, such as the NAACP and Planned Parenthood. Academic departments reflect this; we have departments such as Ethnic Studies and Gender Studies where class is taken into account, but not Class Studies or Marxian Studies. The organization that is meant to address class is labour unions. However the US has transitioned out of an economy based on large-scaled industry into an economy based on the service industry (which actually need people on the ground and thus cannot be outsourced) and professional labour.  Thus, this means that there are less and less work places where there are enough employees for collective bargaining. With small businesses, workers can legally unionize but are much less likely to due to the low number of employees. With subcontracting, workers don’t count as employees. Apparently some agricultural and service industry workers cannot unionize either (Though I am not a labour historian or economist by training, what info I got from here). The bias in public discourse around gender and race that leaves out class may discourage working-class and poor people to organize.

In very broad strokes, I think the lack of a developed class-based critique is due to a chain of eras: the US not being a feudal system with a large wealth gap among its “free citizens,” the Roaring 20s and “fighting the good fight” in WWII creating a good economy and national cohesion, and subsequently the Cold War and anti-Communism. In addition, the Civil Rights movement was focused on rights on the civic level for people who had been denied them based on factors other than class, which was primarily race. It was not a revolution that fundamentally dealt with inequality generated by capitalism, much less global capitalism (though from starting to read scholarship on the Black Panther Party, it seems like they tried).

An example of how Civil Rights-era critiques can miss the mark in current times was when Black students at Scripps College posted an ad asking for a roommate who is a person of colour. I take no issue with the students wanting safe spaces with race as a factor, or even that the students specified this directly on a public posting (more in Part III), but I take issue with the fact that they only specified race as the determining factor for feeling safe. American colleges attract an increasing number of students from Asia, who are broadly defined “people of colour” (and know themselves to be such), however with absolutely no correlation between their race and their political commitments. I live in a Black neighbourhood in LA where I am the only person of Asian descent, though I had temporary Chinese neighbours who moved away because they felt unsafe. One international student from China even called our neighbours “gorillas.” The Black-White paradigm has indeed been salient for the US, however continued migration from Asia in the past forty years has been a part of new global capitalism, leaving Civil Rights-era ideas of where social change comes from narrow and inadequate .*

In addition, I believe that the linguistic and cultural turn, combined with the weight we have collectively given to race and gender, has become a cut-and-dried tool to call out inequality that does not require us to actually look at material factors. Thus, it is easy for liberals to denounce Trump and Trump supporters on their rhetoric, while not explaining in detail why his economic plan is unsound, or explaining what economic factors might have driven his supporters to adopt racist and misogynist language.  Even advocacy for cultural issues that have a significant monetary dimension usually gets couched in a cultural justification first, and material effects second, if at all. An example is the LA Times article where the creator of #OscarsSoWhite was interviewed about diversity in Hollywood. Among her answers, there were multiple mentions of needing to highlight the achievement of people of colour, or that their stories need to be heard; twice she mentions profit motives in the industry as the reason for discrimination; however, nowhere does she talk about how more diverse filmmakers and actors would mean more people of colour getting professional jobs in a massive industry.

This is also a factor in the backlash against political correctness. While I don’t disagree with the spirit of political correctness, it is a mass application of the linguistic turn in a very reductive way. This is especially the case when people understand political correctness as being the change of a few isolated words, such as not calling Natives “Indians,” or asking people to stop saying “hey guys” when talking to women. Most people who follow political correctness do not have much of an awareness how the language they wish to use would address actual material inequality, or fail to explain it in a way that convinces people who do not agree. Some professors I have worked with ask that undergrads to stop using the term “illegal immigrant” and instead use “undocumented immigrant,” which is a way of getting students to stop treating law as though it was naturally-occuring. While this justification makes sense, a teaching strategy that does not make sense to me is taking off marks for writing “illegal immigrant,” which professors have done or have threatened to do. To me, this is in part an undeserved attention to one linguistic term at the expense of other means of demonstrating critical thinking, and in part the uncompromising attitude demonstrated by radicals, which I will discuss in Part III.

Finally, notice that most of not all of the politically incorrect words that we have sought to change are about race, gender, sexuality, and (dis)ability, and almost none are about class; in daily discourse, there is no such thing as an obvious, single-word expression or even a phrase that signals a class-based offense (though “redneck” comes close). This means that disenfranchisement based on class is harder to detect, and unfortunately liberals often avoid doing that work and stick to pointing out linguistic or cultural offenses instead.

In an academic setting, unfortunately the superficial application of the cultural turn is also exacerbated by these scholars negatively judging other social science disciplines. For people in Cultural Studies or Literature, Political Science and Economics have been seen as less suited to social change or even suspect – less successful because their priorities are not conceptual, and suspect because they rely on a structure that, like language, has implicit rules which have biases towards those in power. For example, Political Science to a certain degree assumes that we need a government of some kind, which leftist anarchists (and libertarians) would reject; Economics positively appraises allocating work to decrease opportunity costs and increase specialization to boost overall productivity, rather than question who gains from productivity. In addition, I have seen fellow scholars argue that disciplines that rely on big data cannot address inequality because the complexities of personhood and subjectivity becomes lost in the data. While all of these criticisms might be true, saying that data-driven disciplines are entirely complicit with power would be writing off knowledge that can look at broad material differences in society.


* A further note about the relationship between race and class:

I don’t mean class in terms of any specific ideology or its application such as Marxism or Maoism, and I don’t mean race in terms of the 5 categories offered on the US census. By “race” I mean any constructed definition of a group of humans with unique characteristics linked to their biology. By “class” I mean someone’s economic position relative to their society’s economic range, that comprises their income, inherited wealth, properties and other assets, and how much these things are worth.

I don’t believe that someone’s class is more important than their race when it comes to personal experience, especially not in the US (a historically-grounded and clear essay from Cornel West is helpful to elucidate this). In West’s essay, he points out that one failing of Marxism is that it is too focused on modern industrialized capitalism and the class divisions it generates, and cannot explain pre-modern kinds of racism. This is true. However, class in a Marxian sense is different from economics in a general sense. While I do not believe that the resulting class divisions coming out of industrial capitalism is more important than race for a given individual, I also do not believe that large-scaled demonization of another group based on biology can occur without an economic (or some other resource-based) motivation. The enslavement of Africans did occur before modern capitalism, but they provided cheap labour so that plantation owners could turn a higher profit; thus, while it is not necessarily class in the Marxian sense, there is still a clearly definable economic motive (see Cedric Robinson’s book Black Marxism).

I do not dispute West’s and other cultural studies scholars’ point that relations of power are ideological as well as material (Stuart Hall gives a great integration of this). I also do think that because racially-based ideological justifications for economic domination have happened for so long that they have taken on a life of their own. Thus, even when there are no longer discernible competition over resources, racism still continues. While I don’t dispute radical ethnic studies scholars about how we got here, to me, solving the problems we have comes down to 2 things – 1) whether you think it is easier to change people’s minds or change socio-economic organization, and 2) whether we are focusing on undoing the wrongs of the past, or preventing new wrongs from taking shape in our present.

For me, I believe that it is difficult to change people’s tendencies to band into a group and to demonize other groups based on simplistic reasoning, though we can try to improve on this point. It is more effective if we change structural and economic factors so no group can hold enough power in a way that their demonization of others carry weight, and the potential for economic gain would not be so great that dehumanizing someone else might be worth it. As for the second point, ethnic and gender studies scholars and activists have a very difficult job in working against the discourses that have collected through time. What may have started as economic motives have turned into self-justifying discursive biases, such that in the US, race has determined whether one can participate in civil society or live in certain neighbourhoods. However, this does not mean that all forms of inequality are driven by the same discourses as before. Following from the above post, economic motives now have more subtle means of fulfilling themselves than a recourse to racism. With global capitalism, nationality and class become determining factors on a world scale, even if race is still a determining factor in the US. Even as we attend to how wrongs in the past have happened, it is important to recognize when and where they might have changed.

My discussion about how defining inequality by race is inadequate is also relevant for the debate about whether Black people can be racist or reverse-racist. An explanation of the assertion that Blacks cannot be racist would be helpful: this position says that because Blacks have been on the bottom of the racial hierarchy designed to disenfranchise them, what seems to be reverse-racism is just to mitigate previous racism. This position relies on a metaphor of a numeric scale, where equality means all groups sit at 0, and racism is any racial group trying to rise above 0 by pushing those below 0. This has happened, as Whites have risen in wealth and status over history due to the exploitation of Blacks. Contemporary Blacks, who I think are predominantly still metaphorically below zero, can use means such as affirmative action to get to 0, and insodoing can pull some Whites down to 0. However, until Blacks rise above 0 and push Whites below that, reverse-racism has not occured. This position also takes an overall structural view of racism not as individual acts of discrimination, but an overall social effect of one race rising above another race. Thus, it is not addressing whether individual Blacks can be discriminatory.

I largely agree with this view of racism and fully endorse affirmative action and other efforts at equalizing opportunity. However, while I don’t think Blacks can be racist, I also think that Blacks can be nativist, homophobic, and religiously bigoted. As someone who is not American myself but in American Studies and Ethnic Studies, what I found surprising was how American Black Americans are, especially those who have been in the US for generations and have not lived anywhere else (so not immigrants from the Caribbean, like in Canada). Two of my neighbours, for instance, are older Black Christians who are very nice to me but told me that they believe Mexicans are engaged in a silent but hostile takeover. I think race is a factor that needs to be addressed, however it should not eclipse the real ways that Black Americans can speak from the position of Americans, Christians, and cis-gender and straight people. However, I also think that this is a conversation to be had internal to Black communities rather than have outsiders who don’t understand their positions swooping in to accuse them of wrongdoing.

3 Points Toward a More Receptive and Conciliatory Left, Part I

1) Is objectivity really impossible, and what are some pitfalls in valuing subjectivity?
2) Have we placed an undue emphasis on cultural and linguistic factors when considering inequality?
3) When should we commit to ideological positions, and when should we compromise?


Trump is now president, and the Republicans have gained majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the post-election analysis, blame has been laid on 3rd party candidates, the media for covering Trump and giving him free publicity, Clinton’s past indiscretions, unreliable projections, and the electoral college system. One possible factor that the Democrats have identified is that they hadn’t reached out enough to white working-class voters.

I can’t speak to campaign strategies and their miscalculations; however, as a graduate student in a leftist interdisciplinary department, I have been frustrated for years at my fellow scholars’ ideological purity. I believe that a deterioration of civil society is scary, but I also fear that Trump being elected has vindicated a belief on the left that the right is so far gone that we have nothing to work with, while believing ourselves morally and intellectually superior. The use of “social justice warriors” and “feminazi” in dismissive and derogatory ways certainly speaks to resistance on the part of conservatives, however the sheer frequency of these labels makes me believe that the fault does not lie entirely with them.  Finally, the fact that many college-educated men backed Trump, and that even great numbers of White women voted for him, says that there is something we’re missing in the work we do in liberal arts research and higher education, even as we are trying to educate the electorate.

This is a part of a series of 3 posts that will try to answer the 3 questions above. Each of the 3 questions tries to interrogate a concept that, as I see it, has become common sense to thinkers on the left to the extent that we cannot apply it with nuance or communicate its value to non-believers. Each post will explain and give examples of one concept and its goals, then a response discussing its shortcomings and misapplication.


Progressive Concept #1: Objectivity is a fallacy, but the personal is political.

We are taught that it is impossible to hold a belief that is uncoloured by attributes historically deemed to be personal, such as race, class, gender, and sexuality. Following from this, absolute impartiality and apositionality is impossible.  This critique has been leveled the most often at ideas received from straight, Euro-American men of middle and upper classes who have assumed that their ideas are universally applicable and objective. For example, Enlightenment Humanism in Europe established that autonomy and rationality should be recognized as universal human attributes that justified freedom from religious and feudal tyranny, instigating the development of the middle class and the early modern society; however, the rise of a core middle class that came about due to denigrating Black Africans as non-human and profiting from their slave labour (ie in Sylvia Wynter’s scholarship). In the 3/5th Compromise of the US, the Northern, predominantly anti-slavery states did not want to count slaves as human for taxation and representation, because this would give Southern states more power; actual costs and benefits overrode principle. Thus, supposedly universal and objective concepts like humanism cannot be assumed to really be truly universal, because they are contradictory and have been applied selectively to benefit certain groups.

If nothing is absolutely objective or universal, then nothing is absolutely personal either; personal background are informed by forces outside of oneself and have effects outside of oneself. If middle-class White men have failed to generate and apply truly objective or universal principles, then we must ensure that all backgrounds are represented so a diversity of subjective perspectives have the opportunity to reflect upon public matters together. These theories have influenced and are influenced by postmodernism in general, which insists on relativity rather than absolutes.

Finally, because nothing is absolutely private and personal, there is also no such thing as absolutely personal achievements, nor absolutely personal failure. Failures get pinned on people who have been the most directly involved, however there tends to be a lack of awareness of how they have been constrained. One example is attributing healthy dietary habits and weight management to personal effort, and a backlash against obesity being counted as a disability that people could claim benefits for. I have lived in South Central LA for 5 years and seen 2 supermarkets shut down in my neighbourhood, while there are multiple fast food restaurants and liquor stores on every block. Juvenile diabetes is also rampant in my area, as evidenced by multiple PSA posters at bus stops. Even I have difficulty maintaining a healthy diet when busy and stressed, so it would be unreasonable to expect a single mother working multiple part-time and low-paying jobs to provide and teach her children about healthy diets all on her own personal effort. This is a fundamental issue in the disagreement between proponents of more public spending and proponents of less public spending – the former criticizes the latter of mistaking structural benefits for personal attributes and effort when it conveniences them to do so.

Response #1: The personal is not always political, and the personal does not have desired political effects without contextualization and connections to political aspirations.

I should make clear that, as per the first half of this post, I take no issue with explaining personal achievements and failures through structural factors. What concerns me is that valuing subjectivity has been reduced to personal expression, which has been emphasized through consumer culture and mass media. The constant valorization of personal expression leads to:

a) individuals of historically disenfranchised or under-represented groups presenting a personal opinion as representative of their whole group without contextualization

b) disenfranchised groups emphasizing evidence that support their ideological commitments while ignoring evidence that does not, or use the impossibility of being perfectly objective as an excuse to not try to be.

I am also not saying that groups in power have avoided these pitfalls (from the first half of this post, I definitely don’t think they have) but I don’t think that progressives can change things by fighting fire with fire.

That we attribute so much power to personal expression has to do with a system of adversarial democracy and an adversarial justice system (more in Part III). These civic systems lead to a cultural practice of representing one’s own argument, such as in the argumentative essay. However, to me these are not the most significant factors; it is consumer culture and social media that has made the last couple of generations predisposed to broadcasting personal expression with the assumption that the act in of itself is political.

Consumer culture is a significant force in the West: with industrial standardization, most of our jobs are specialized roles that does not allow us to express ourselves, so the only means of expressing ourselves through our personal lives. However, most of what we need in life comes in commodities that someone outside of our society as made. Thus, we create our own sense of self through buying things and paying for services. Marketers take advantage of this through market segmentation, where consumers are divided into smaller subgroups based on different needs; thus, when we buy something, we feel like it is tailored to us, and that we can express ourselves through it, and even become better through it. Car commercials, for example, tell us that the specific car would make us into an urbane professional or a rugged outdoorsman. L’oreal’s famous tagline is “Because you’re worth it.”

More recently, social media can also be seen as a way of marketing ourselves (and also as an extremely specialized way of marketing to us). Self-expression on social media garners positive feedback often not on the content being shared, but the act of sharing. For example, selfies will almost always garner positive feedback about how confident the person is in showing their face / body and sharing it with everyone. This cycles into people posting things online for the positive feedback they get on the act of expressing themselves, rather than deliberating on whether the content of what they are posting actually moves discussion on a topic forwards or achieves any material effects.

Feminist popularized the statement “the personal is political,” however it has been corrupted in recent generations of both men and women. However, I am more critical towards contemporary liberal feminism, partly because I think the burden of doing better should be on the actors who claim they can do better than the status quo, and partly because of negative personal experiences with individuals claiming to be feminists. Two articles about gender representation in videogames each illustrate the 2 pitfalls of emphasizing subjectivity.*

The first is an article about the update to Lara Croft’s representation in the Tomb Raider franchise. Peacock, the author, expresses disappointment that the realism of recent games reminds her too much that Lara is a frightened and vulnerable young woman as opposed to a badass tomb raider on par with men, citing examples such as Lara saying she’s cold, or Lara being assaulted, a scene which evokes rape. It is not that Peacock’s points are invalid, and I appreciate that she describes these conclusions as her own opinion. However, for the Women’s section of a mainstream and prominent outlet such as the Telegraph, I believe that Peacock could have better contextualized her opinion among other divergent feminist perspectives, even if this was an editorial. The new Lara Croft facing realistic obstacles that women face and giving realistic responses for a young woman most likely comes out of ideas that to be equal to men does not mean to be the same as men, and that the capacity for women to show vulnerability means that they have not been brainwashed by patriarchal society to believe that masculine toughness is the only valid state of mind. Giving Lara these traits makes her more of a complex and evolving character rather than the sex symbol of before, and more relatable for female players.  Feminists writing articles based on personal experiences is not invalid in of itself; however, I do think that this partly explains why men (and non-conforming women, such as in the above link) have a hard time approaching feminism, when individual women give divergent arguments, yet each woman insists or implies that their own personal belief is the political reality for all women.

Another article illustrates the problem when ideologically driven research ignores counter-arguments and evidence that does not support their claims. This article is about Rimworld, where the player is in charge of a colony of initially 3 people on another planet and assigning them tasks so they survive and prosper. The gender of the colonists determines different programming for thoughts and behaviour. Lo, the author, takes issue with how, among other things, female colonists are programmed to rarely initiate romance and to be not affected when rejecting romance, and male colonists are never programmed to be bisexual. The effect of this article on me was different than the piece on Tomb Raider, since I know less about programming than about representations and was impressed that Lo managed to dig into the code at all. The tone of the article also seemed fairly objective and her conclusions were not opinions, but rather fairly objective descriptions about the game mechanics. However, I cannot write off the developers’ objections in the comments as he explained that there was a updated version of the game where many of the issues Lo points out had been fixed, but she did not examine that version, and in addition he had asked that his full explanations be reproduced in the article but was refused. The Editor’s Note from Rock Paper Shotgun is that agreeing to reproduce the developer’s interview in full would be ceding editorial control. To me, this says that Lo and the editors already have an angle in mind based on preliminary research, and would exert editorial control to convey this angle even in the face of contradicting evidence. Similarly to representing individual opinions as representative ones, this lack of objective methodological rigour allied with strong ideological commitments can also drive away potential supporters who do not yet share those ideological commitments.

To me, the latter is a more serious issue for society, even though the former bothers me more personally. The reason for my personal discomfort at the former is that I have often run up against 3rd wave Euro-American feminists who assume that their perspectives, aspirations, and standards of femininity apply to me. At the same time, they reinforce one another’s personal expressions while denouncing critique as being anti-feminist, which prevents them from hearing about alternate feminisms. One particularly troubling incident occurred in a senior undergrad art class where the class votes on a semester theme, and the White female majority of the class chose sex; they then voted to replace the usual year-end gallery exhibit with public art installations around campus. Muslim student groups objected when they saw sexually explicit material being displayed in public space, however the art students wrote them off as being repressed and oppressed by their religion. I did not have the language to convince my class and thus my arguments weren’t particularly effective. To this day I am not sure how the professor could have not stepped in to at least clearly lay out what was at stake for my fellow students (There was also an incident where a fellow Women’s Studies TA told her classes that she hated men, which I will discuss more in Part III).

I do think that implying that personal opinions are representative of one’s identity group can be mitigated by having multiple individual opinions in the public sphere, and giving more critical and integrative tools to everyone so they know how to evaluate personal claims together to arrive at a bigger picture. Ideological-driven research that ignores evidence would be more devastating on a larger scale, since it is exactly what the far right does when they ignore how free market capitalism coupled with a limited government would produce mass inequality, and insist it would be better for everyone. At the very least, ideologically-driven policy-making it would lead to ineffectual leadership because certain groups and their interests would be not consulted based on ideological differences, leading to factors that the governing group cannot foresee or harness. Just because everything is at some degree ideological does not mean that we have an excuse to not examine our ideologies and positionalities.

* I chose articles that have to do with video games because gender and gaming has been a very hot topic after Gamergate, and it is the area where men have explicitly and unilaterally defended their identity as men. In addition, as a woman who has recently discovered gaming, I read more about games than any other medium (maybe other than comics, and my own academic reading). Regarding the issue of gender in video games, I think the above post undergirds my opinion. I agree with women who believe that video games and the culture around them exclude women and perpetuate harmful gender standards and should change to keep pace with a changing society. However, I also think that women have been asking for change in an antagonistic, unilateral, and internally contradictory way that doesn’t actually give much constructive plans to work from (such as the article on Lara Croft).

I say “unilateral” because while gender is the most salient factor, it should not be the only factor being considered. Most of my male friends who love games are nerdy Asian immigrants, who would have to combat an equally detrimental system of negative racial imagery to be fit in with mainstream men, and even more so to be desired by mainstream women. I would hazard a guess to say that many people (including men) who are die-hard fans of anything (including games) got into it because they were not welcomed into many other things society has to offer. Men who are excluded on factors other than gender can find community in video games, and thus I do think that gaming culture, if not the maleness thereoff, can be defended to a certain extent against mainstream feminism and its exclusive focus on gender. However, this defense should not be couched in purely gendered terms, and cannot take the form of personal attacks on women and their private lives. Ideally, neither side needs to throw the baby out with the bathwater; both sides should come up with ways to reject gender stereotypes and exclusion in games while maintaining games as a unique culture that many men have deeply identified with.